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Abstract— The paper studies the routing in the network shared
by several users. Each user seeks to optimize either its own
performance or some combination between its own performance
and that of other users, by controlling the routing of its given flow
demand. We parameterize the degree of cooperation which allows
to cover the fully non-cooperative behavior, the fully cooperative
behavior, and even more, the fully altruistic behavior, all these as
special cases of the parameter’s choice. A large part of the work
consists in exploring the impact of the degree of cooperation on
the equilibrium. Our first finding is to identify multiple Nash
equilibria with cooperative behavior that do not occur in the
non-cooperative case under the same conditions (cost, demand
and topology). We then identify Braess like paradox (in which
adding capacity or adding a link to a network results in worse
performance to all users) in presence of user’s cooperation. We
identify another type of paradox in cooperation scenario: when
a given user increases its degree of cooperation while other
users keep unchanged their degree of cooperation, this may
lead to an improvement in performance of that given user. We
then pursue the exploration and carry it on to the setting of
Mixed equilibrium (i.e. some users are non atomic-they have
infinitesimally small demand, and other have finite fixed demand).
We finally obtain some theoretical results that show that for low
degree of cooperation the equilibrium is unique, confirming the
results of our numerical study.
I. INTRODUCTION
Non-cooperative routing has long been studied both in
the framework of road-traffic as well as in the framework
of telecommunication networks. Such frameworks allow to
model the flow configuration that results in networks in which
routing decisions are made in a non-cooperative and dis-
tributed manner between the users. In the case of a finite (not
very large) number of agents, the resulting flow configuration
corresponds to the so called Nash equilibrium [17] defined
as a situation in which no agent has an incentive to deviate
unilaterally. The Nash equilibrium has been extensively used
in telecommunications, see e.g. [2], [6]. The authors in [2]
studied a routing games in which each user has a given
amount of flow to ship and has several paths through which
he may split that flow. Such a routing game may be handled
by models similar to [8] in the special case of a topology
of parallel links. This type of topology is studied in detail in
the first part of [2] as well as in [9]. However, the model of
[8] does not extend directly to other topologies. Indeed, in
more general topologies, the delay over a path depends on
how much traffic is sent by other users on any other path that
shares common links. Routing games with general topologies
have been studied, for example, in the second part of [2], as
well as in [9]. A related model was studied thirty years ago
by Rosenthal in [10], yet in a discrete setting. It is shown
that in such a model there always exists a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium. He introduces a kind of discrete potential function
for computing the equilibrium. Nevertheless if a player has
more than 1 unit to ship such an equilibrium doesn’t always
exist.
In this work, we embark on experimental investigation of
the impact of cooperation in the context of routing games.
In particular we consider parallel links and load balancing
network topology for investigation, originally presented in [2]
and [7] in the context of selfish users. The experimentation
is mainly aimed at exploring some strange behaviors which
appears in presence of user’s partial cooperation (Cooperation
in Degree), which is further strengthened with some theoretical
results.
Firstly, we identify loss of uniqueness of Nash equilibria.
We show by a simple example of parallel links and load
balancing network that there may exist several such equi-
libria. Moreover, even the uniqueness of link utilization at
equilibria may fail even in the case of simple topology. A
similar example of parallel links, in absence of the cooperation
between users there would be a single equilibrium [2]. Beyond
Nash equilibrium we investigate further in the setting of
Mixed users i.e. where there are two types of users, Group
user and Individual users. Group users seek Nash equilibrium
while the Individual users seek equilibrium with Wardrop
conditions. Strengthening our earlier finding, we observe loss
of uniqueness with partial cooperation against the unique
solutions shown in [15] for selfish users. However in the
latter section (Sec. V), we show theoretically that there exist
uniqueness of Nash equilibrium under some conditions in the
presence of cooperation between users.
Secondly, we identify paradoxical behavior in presence of
such cooperation. One of the observed paradox here is a kind
of Braess paradox, a well studied paradox in routing context.
Braess paradox has attracted attention of many researchers in
context of routing games especially related to upgrading the
system, see [4]- [7]. The famous Braess paradox tell us that
increasing resources to the system leads to degraded perfor-
mance in some cases. Such paradox is originally shown to exist
in many scenarios, e.g. Braess network in [5], Load balancing
network in [7]. Although such paradoxes are found even in
the case of selfish users earlier, their existence even in case of
such partial cooperation is highlighted here. We show that as
the link capacity increases the overall cost of a user decreases
i.e. addition of resources in the system can tentatively lead to
degraded performance. Even more, we also identify another
kind of paradox related to degree of Cooperation: When a
user increases its degree of cooperation while other users keep
their degree of cooperation unchanged, leads to performance
improvement of that user. We also observe similar behavior
even when other user also increase their degree of cooperation.
The paper is structured as follows : In section II, we present
the system model, define our framework of cooperative user
and, formulate the problem. Further in section III we detail
the numerical investigation and summarize the findings. Based
on one of the findings, we depict more examples identifying
Braess paradox in the setting of Nash game in subsection
III-C. In section IV, mixed equilibrium is illustrated. In section
V, we develop theoretical results to show the conditions
where uniqueness can be established in presence of users
cooperation. In section VI we summarize the study of impact
of cooperation.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a network (V ,L), where V is a finite set of
nodes and L ⊆ V × V is a set of directed links. For simplicity
of notation and without loss of generality, we assume that
at most one link exists between each pair of nodes (in each
direction). For any link l = (u, v) ∈ L ,define S(l) = u and
D(l) = v. Considering a node v ∈ V , let In(v) = {l : D(l) =
v} denote the set of its in-going links, and Out(v) = {l :
S(l) = v} the set of its out-going links.
A set I = {1, 2, ..., I} of users share the network (V ,L),
where each source node acts as a user in our frame work.
We shall assume that all users ship flow from source node
s to a common destination d. Each user i has a throughput
demand that is some process with average rate ri. User i splits
its demand ri among the paths connecting the source to the
destination, so as to optimize some individual performance
objective. Let f il denote the expected flow that user i sends
on link l. The user flow configuration f i = (f il )l∈L is called
a routing strategy of user i. The set of strategies of user i that
satisfy the user’s demand and preserve its flow at all nodes is
called the strategy space of user i and is denoted by Fi, that
is:
F
i = {f i ∈ R|L|;
∑
l∈Out(v)
f il =
∑
l∈In(v)
f il + r
i
v, v ∈ V},
where ris = ri, rid = −ri and riv = 0 for v 6= s, d. The
system flow configuration f = (f1, ..., f I) is called a routing
strategy profile and takes values in the product strategy space
F = ⊗i∈IFi.
The objective of each user i is to find an admissible
routing strategy f i ∈ Fi so as to minimize some performance
objective, or cost function, J i, that depends upon f i but also
upon the routing strategies of other users. Hence J i(f) is the
cost of user i under routing strategy profile f .
A. Nash equilibrium
Each user in this frame work minimizes his own cost
functions which leads to the concept of Nash equilibrium. The
minimization problem here depends on the routing decision of
other users, i.e., their routing strategy
f−i = (f1, ..., fi−1, fi+1, ...fI),
Definition 1 A vector f˜ i, i = 1, 2, ..., I is called a Nash
equilibrium if for each user i, f˜ i minimizes the cost function
given that other users’ routing decisions are f˜ j , j 6= i. In
other words,
J i(f˜1, f˜2, ..., f˜ I) = min
f i∈Fi
J i(f˜1, f˜2, ..., f i, ..., f˜ I),
i = 1, 2, ..., I, (1)
where Fi is the routing strategy space of user i.
Nash equilibrium has been discussed in the context of
non-cooperative game with selfish users quite often in recent
studies.
In this paper we study a new aspect of cooperative routing
games where some users cooperate with the system taking into
account the performance of other users. We define this degree
of Cooperation as follows :
Definition 2 Let
−→
αi = (αi1, .., α
i
|I|) be the degree of Cooper-
ation for user i. The new operating cost function Jˆ i of user
i with Degree of Cooperation, is a convex combination of the
cost of user from set I,
Jˆ i(f) =
∑
k∈I
αikJ
k(f);
∑
k
αik = 1, i = 1, ...|I|
where Jˆ i(f) is a function of system flow configuration f with
cooperation.
Based on the degree of Cooperation vector, we can view the
following properties for user i,
• Non cooperative user : if αii = 0.
• Altruistic user : User i is fully cooperative with all users
and does not care for his benefits, i.e., αii = 1.
• Equally cooperative - if αij = 1|P| , user i is equally
cooperative with each user j, where j ∈ P ,P ⊆ I.
Note that the new operating cost function of a user is the
performance measure with degree of Cooperation, where it
takes into account the cost of other users. Although a user
cooperating with the system, it attempts to minimize its own
operating cost function in the game setting. Hence such frame
work can be classified under non-cooperative games and the
thus we can benefit to apply the properties of non-cooperative
games in such scenario.
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III. NUMERICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE ROLE OF
COOPERATION
In this section we detail some numerical examples to study
the routing game in the presence of cooperation between some
users. In these examples, we use two types of cost functions
: linear function which is often used in the transportation
network and M/M/1 function which is used in the queuing
networks. We consider two network topologies : parallel links
[2] and load balancing networks [6] which are defined below
Load Balancing Network: A simple load balancing topology
of network G consists of 3 nodes is depicted in Fig. 1(a).
This topology has been widely studied in context of queuing
networks. The nodes are numbered 1, 2, 3 and communication
links among them are numbered as l1, l2, l3, l4. Node 1, 2
acts as source node and node 3 acts as destination node.
Link l1, l2 are directed links for nodes 1, 3 and nodes 2, 3
where as, link l3, l4 are directed link for nodes 1, 2 and nodes
2, 1. Cost function of user i is the sum of cost of each link
J i =
∑
l∈{1,...4} f
i
l Tl(fl) , where Tl(fl) is the link cost
function. The cost of each user i with cooperation can be
defined as below,
Jˆ i =
∑
l∈{1,...4}
∑
k∈{1,2}
αikf
k
l Tl(fl) (2)
Parallel Links Network: A simple parallel links topology of
network G consists of 2 nodes is depicted in Fig. 1(b) which
is originally discuses in [2]. The nodes are numbered 1, 2 and
communication links between them are numbered as l1, l2.
Node 1 acts as source node and node 2 acts as destination
node. Cost function of user i is the sum of cost of each
link J i =
∑
l∈{1,2} f
i
l Tl(fl) , where Tl(fl) is the link cost
function. The cost of each user i with cooperation can be
defined as below,
Jˆ i =
∑
l∈{1,2}
∑
k∈{1,2}
αikf
k
l Tl(fl) (3)
For each network topology, we consider both the cost functions
for investigation.
Linear Cost Function: Linear link cost function is defined
as, Tl(fli) = aifli + gi for link i = 1, 2, where as, Tl(flj ) =
cflj + d for link j = 3, 4.
M/M/1 Delay Cost Function: The link cost function can be
defined as, Tl(fli) = 1Cli−fli , where Cli and fli denote the
total capacity and total flow of the link li. Note that this cost
represents the average expected delay in a M/M/1 queue with
exponentially distributed inter arrival times and service times
under various regimes such as the FIFO (First In First Out)
regime in which customers are served in the order of arrivals,
the PS (Processor sharing) regime and the LIFO (Last In First
Out) regime. This same cost describes in fact the expected
average delays in other settings as well such as the M/G/1
queue (exponentially distributed inter arrival times and general
independent service times) under the PS or the LIFO regime.
A. Numerical Examples
We consider two users share a network. We distinguish two
cases. An asymmetric case in which the user 1 is cooperative
with α11 > 0 and user 2 is noncooperative, i.e., α22 = 0.
The second case is symmetric case in which both users
are cooperative with the same degree of cooperation α. We
compute the Nash equilibrium at sufficiently many points of
degree of Cooperation α in the interval [0,1] and plot the
corresponding user cost and user flow. Here user flow signifies
the fraction of demand flowing in the corresponding user
destination link. Since we consider only two links, the fraction
of demand flow in one route complements that of the other
route. Hence we plot the fraction of demand corresponding to
the user, i.e., f1l1 for user 1 and f
2
l2
for user 2. In sequel we
describe five experiments as follows:
Experiment 1) Load balancing network with linear link cost:
In Fig. 2(a)-2(b), we plot the cost and the flow obtained at
Nash equilibrium versus α in the range [0, 1]. Note that the
plot of user 1 and 2 overlap in the figure in symmetrical case.
This is due to the same degree of Cooperation.
Experiment 2) Parallel links with linear link cost: In Fig.
3(a),3(b), we plot the cost function and the flow for both users
obtained at Nash equilibrium for α in the range of [0, 1].
Experiment 3) Load balancing network with M/M/1 link
cost: Consider the parameters for the link cost functions as,
a1 = 4, g1 = 1, a2 = 2, g2 = 2, r
1 = 1.2, r2 = 1. In Fig.
4(a),4(b), we plot cost and flow obtained at Nash equilibrium
for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Experiment 4) Parallel links with M/M/1 link cost: In Fig.
5(a),5(b), we plot the cost function and the flow for both users
obtained at Nash equilibrium versus α.
Experiment 5) Load balancing network with linear link cost:
We vary the link cost for l3 and l4 by varying the parameter c.
More precisely, we increase c from 0 to 1000 in the steps of
20 and compute Nash equilibrium at each point. In Fig.6, we
plot the cost of each user with the increasing link cost of the
link l3 and l4. Note that when the link cost is high signifies
that link doesn’t exit. We analyze the results obtained from
the experimentation done above. We will be using α and α1
alternatively here for simplicity as we have fixed α2 = 1 for
asymmetrical case and α1 = α2 for symmetrical case. The
important behavior can be summarized under following two
headings.
B. Non uniqueness of Nash equilibrium
In Fig. 2, we observe that there exist multiple Nash
equilibria for both symmetrical case and asymmetrical case.
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Note that multiple Nash equilibria is constrained to some
range of cooperation(α). However there also exist some range
of cooperation where unique solution exist. We observe that
there exist three Nash equilibrium for some range of co-
operation, two Nash equilibrium at one point and, unique
Nash equilibrium for some range of cooperation. In Fig. [4-
6](a,b), we obtain multiple Nash equilibria as above for some
range of cooperation. In Fig. 3-5 although α1 = α2, due to
other parameter being non-symmetrical, we do not observe
a symmetrical plot for ”J1, J2-Symmetrical”. Uniqueness of
Nash equilibrium is shown in [2], for a similar situation as
in Fig. 3 for selfish user, but we observe loss of uniqueness
when users have some cooperation.
C. Braess like paradox
We also observe a Braess kind of paradox which is related to
performance when additional resource is added to the system.
To understand this, consider the topology of experiment 1, i.e.,
the load balancing network topology. Consider a configuration
where initially link l3 and l4 has very high cost (effectively
doesn’t exist) and latter the link cost is reduced to a low value
e.g. c = 0 and d = 0.5. This can be interpreted as an additional
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resources added to the system. Observe than for the initial
configuration the cost of user 1 is J1 = 1 and cost of user 2
is J2 = 1 in experiment 1. However in the latter configuration
which is depicted in Fig. 2(a), we observe the cost of user
1 and 2 is greater that 1 at Nash equilibria. This explains
degradation of performance when resources are increased. A
very clearer observation can be made in Fig.6 where the link
cost for link l3 and l4 is parameterized. Due to multiple Nash
equilibria we see two curves. The lower curve corresponds to
Nash solutions where flow for each user choose direct link to
destination while the upper curve correspond to mixed strategy
solution where a fraction of flow for each user choose direct
link path. Notice that user cost is improving as the link cost is
increasing for the upper curve. Such paradox is widely studied
as Braess paradox in many literature. Above we identified
the existence of Braess paradox in load balancing network.
Now we identify the Braess paradox in parallel links topology.
Consider the parameters as follows, Cl1 = 4.1Cl2 = 4.1 r1 =
2 r2 = 1. Consider the scenario when initially the link l3, l4
does not exist, while latter they are added in the system. In
other words, the initially the capacity C3 = 0, C4 = 0, and
latter it is C3 = 10, C4 = 10. Note that when C3 = 0, C4 = 0,
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flow at Nash equilibrium is trivially fl1 = 1, fl2 = 1. In the
following, we consider two scenarios of degree of cooperation
:
Only one user is Cooperative : The degree of Cooperation
taken in this case is α1 = 0.93, α2 = 0. On increasing
the capacity C3, C4 from 0 → 10, the cost functions at
Nash equilibrium are obtained as J1 = 0.952 → 2.06,
J2 = 0.3225 → 0.909 and the flows are fl1 = 2 → 0,
fl2 = 1 → 0.0951. We also obtain another Nash equilibrium
where the cost functions and the flow doesn’t change from
initial state. Note that increasing the capacity in the network
degrades the performance at the first Nash equilibrium.
Both users are Cooperative : We repeat the above ex-
periment with the degree of Cooperation α1 = 0.9, α2 =
0.9. The cost functions at Nash equilibrium are obtained as
J1 = 0.952 → 1.247, J2 = 0.3225 → 0.430. We again
obtain another Nash equilibrium where the cost functions
and the flow doesn’t change from initial state. Note that
again increasing the capacity in the network degrades the
performance at the first Nash equilibrium.
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D. Paradox in cooperation
In Fig. 2(a), we observe that J1 has higher cost than J2.
This is intuitive because user 2 is selfish user while user 1
has a varying degree of Cooperation. In particular remark that
α1 ↓ 0, J1 ↑ J2. But this is not true for the whole range of
Cooperation. Observe in Fig. (3.a) a non intuitive behavior for
some small range of α1 (approximately α1 ∈ (0.87, 1). Notice
that when the degree of cooperation α1 increases (i.e. increase
in its altruism) while other user be pure selfish (α2 = 0), leads
to improved cost of user 1. This is a paradoxical behavior,
we call it paradox in cooperation. This paradox also exist
in case of symmetrical cooperation (see J1-Symmetrical, J2-
Symmetrical ) in the range of α approximately (0, 0.4). Notice
that such paradox is still observed in Fig. 3-4. Remark that
such paradox exist only when there are multiple equilibria.
IV. MIXED EQUILIBRIUM
The concept of mixed-equilibrium (M.E.) has been intro-
duced by Harker [14] (and further applied in [16] to a dynamic
equilibrium and in [15] to a specific load balancing problem).
Harker has established the existence of the M.E., characterized
it through variational inequalities, and gave conditions for its
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uniqueness. We discuss here the behavior of mixed equilibrium
in presence of partial cooperation. Consider the network (V ,L)
shared by two types of users: (i) group users (denoted by
N ) : these users have to route a large amount of jobs; (ii)
individual users; these users have a single job to route through
the network form a given source to a given destination. There
are infinitely many individual users. For simplicity, we assume
that all individual users have a common source s and common
destination d. Let P be the set of possible paths which go from
s to d.
Cost function
- J i : F → [0,∞) is the cost function for each user i ∈ N
- Fp : F → [0,∞), is the cost function of path p for each
individual user.
The aim of each user is to minimize its cost, i.e., for i ∈ N ,
minfi J
i(f) and for individual user, minp∈P F ip(f). Let fp be
the amount of individual users that choose path p.
Definition 3 f ∈ F is a Mixed Equilibrium (M.E.) if
∀i ∈ N , ∀gis.t.(f−i, gi) ∈ F, Jˆ i(f) ≤ Jˆ i(f−i, gi)
∀p ∈ P , F(p)(f)−A ≥ 0; (F(p)(f)−A)f i(p) = 0
where A = minp∈P Fp(f)
A. Mixed equilibrium in parallel links
In the following proposition, we provide some closed form
of Mixed equilibrium in parallel links.
Proposition 1 Consider parallel links network topology (Fig.
1(b)) and M/M/1 delay link cost function. Consider that a
Group type user and Individual type users are operating in
this network. The mixed equilibrium strategy (f1∗l1 , f
2∗
l2
) can
be given exactly as follows,
1) When Both link is used at Wardrop equilibrium:

(M1, N1) if a1 < M1 < b1;
otherwise
(0,−cc) if r1 < min
“
r2+C2−C1,α(C2−C1)+2αr22α−1
”
,
(r1, r1 − cc) if r1 < min
“
α(C2−C1)
1−2α ,r2−(C2−C1)
”
,
where
M1 =
−α(C2−C1)+r1(2α−1)
2(2α−1)
, N1 =
(C1−C2)(1−α)+(2α−1)r2
2(2α−1)
,
a1 = max(−C2−C12 −
r2−r1
2 ,0), b1 = min(−
C2−C1
2 +
r1+r2
2 ,r1),
cc = −C2−C12 −
r2−r1
2 , dd = −
C2−C1
2 +
r2+r1
2 ,
2) When only one link (1) is used at Wardrop equilibrium:

(M2, 0) if c1 < M2 < r1;
otherwise
(c1, 0) if h(r1) > 0,
(r1, 0) if h(r1) < 0,
where c1 = max(−C2−C12 −
r2−r1
2 , 0) and M2 is the
unique (if there exists) root of the quadratic equation
h(x) = ax2 + bx+ c = 0
in [c1, r1]. The coefficients of the quadratic equation are
a=((C1−C2+r2)(1−α)−αr2); b=(C1(1−α)(2(C2−r2−r1)
+2(C2−r2))+2αr2C1); c=C1(1−α)[(C2−r1−r2)2
−C1(C2−r2)]−αr2C21 .
3) When only one link (2) is used by Wardrop user:

(M3, r2) if 0 < M3 < d1;
otherwise
(0, r2) if h(0) > 0,
(d1, r2) if h(0) < 0,
where d1 = min(−C2−C12 +
r2+r1
2 , r1) and M3 is the
unique root(if there exist) of the quadratic equation
g(x) = ax2 + bx+ c = 0
in [0, d1]. The coefficients of the quadratic equation are
a=((C1−C2+r2)(1−α)−αr2); b=(C1(1−α)
(2(C2−r2−r1)+2(C2−r2))+2αr2C1); c=C1(1−α)
[(C2−r1−r2)2−C1(C2−r2)]−αr2C21 .
Proof: We first state the general condition for the mixed
equilibrium to exist. Based on link uses, there are 3 scenarios
when Wardrop conditions can be met for equilibrium to exist.
We individually state each of them and then we establish the
conditions for equilibria.
For link cost to be finite the link flow must satisfy the
flow constraint fl1 < C1, fl2 < C2. From this we obtain
the general condition r1 + r2 < C1 + C2. Equilibria can be
attained in the following conditions:
1) When both link is used by Wardrop users: Wardrop users
utilize both the links, i.e., f2l1 > 0, f
2
l2
> 0, implies
cost of both links are same, i.e., Tl1(fl1) = Tl2(fl2)
(we use Tl1(fl1) instead of Fl1(fl1) from def. 3). From
Tl1(fl1) = Tl2(fl2) ⇒ f
2
l2
= −cc + f1l1 , 0 < f
1
l1
< r1,
and 0 < f2l2 < r2 imply that a1 ≤ f
1∗
l1
≤ b1,
where a1 = max(cc, 0), b1 = min(dd, r1),
cc = −C2−C12 −
r2−r1
2 and dd = −
C2−C1
2 +
r2+r1
2 .
Thus the necessary conditions for equilibrium to exist
reduces to r1 + r2 > |C1 − C2| by noting cc < r1 and
dd > 0. Thus the equilibrium strategy (f1∗l1 , f
2∗
l2
) is
given by


(M1, N1) if a1 < M1 < b1; otherwise,
(0,−cc) if r1 < min
“
r2+C2−C1,α(C2−C1)+2αr22α−1
”
,
(r1, r1 − cc) if r1 < min
“
α(C2−C1)
1−2α ,r2−(C2−C1)
”
,
where
M1 =
−α(C2−C1)+r1(2α−1)
2(2α−1)
, N1 =
(C1−C2)(1−α)+(2α−1)r2
2(2α−1)
.
Note that J1(f1l1 , f
2
l2
) is strict convex in the range
0 < f1l1 < r1, 0 < f
2∗
l2
< r2( by definition of
M/M/1 cost function). It can be directly inferred that
if the equilibrium point (M1, N1) satisfies the condition
a1 < M1 < b1, (it is an interior point) there exist atmost
one equilibrium.
Otherwise when there is no interior equilibrium point,
there may exist equilibrium at fl11 = 0 or fl11 = r1,
i.e at point (0,−cc) or at point (r1, r1 − cc) (since
T l1(fl1) = T l2(fl2) implies f2l2 = −cc + fl
1
1). The
point (0,−cc) can be an equilibrium point only
when a1 = max(0, cc) = 0 and J ′1(0, cc) > 0.
This directly implies r1 < r2 + (C2 − C1), and
r1 <
α(C2−C1)+2αr2
2α−1 respectively. Combining these,
we get r1 < min
{
r2 + (C2 − C1),
α(C2−C1)+2αr2
2α−1
}
.
Following the similar steps we can directly obtain that
point (r1, r1 − cc) can be an equilibrium point when
r1 < min
{
α(C2−C1)
1−2α , r2 − (C2 − C1)
}
.
2) When only one link (link 1) is used by Wardrop user:
In this case, Wardrop users utilize only link 1, i.e., f2l2 =
0. This directly implies Tl1(fl1) ≤ Tl2(fl2)⇒ f1l1 ≤ cc(from wardrop condition). Combining the above with
positive flow condition 0 ≤ f1∗l1 ≤ r1, we obtain
0 ≤ f1
∗
l1
≤ c1, where c1 = min {cc, r1}. Since c1 must
be greater than 0, the necessary condition for equilibrium
to exist reduces to r1 − r2 ≥ C1 − C2. Further the
equilibrium strategy (f1∗l1 , f
2∗
l2
) is given by

(M2, 0) if 0 < M2 < c1;
otherwise,
(0, 0) if h(0) > 0,
(c1, 0) if h(0) < 0,
where M2 is the unique root of quadratic equation
h(x) = ax2 + bx + c. Let x1 = −b+
√
D
2a , x2 =
−b−√D
2a
are the roots of the Quadratic equation h(x) = 0,
where a = (C1 − C2 − r2)(1 − α) + αr2; b = 2(1 −
α)[(C1 − r2)(2(C2 − r2) + r1)] + 2αr2(C2 − r1); c =
(1 − α)(C1 − r2)[(C2 − r1)2 − (C2 − r1)(C1 − r2) −
r1(C1 − r2)] + αr2(C2 − r1)2; D = b2 − 4ac.
The quadratic equation h(x) = 0 will have unique
solution in the range 0 < f1l1 < r1 because J
′1(f11 , 0) is
strict convex in the range 0 < f1l1 < r1 ( by definition
of M/M/1 cost function). Hence there can be atmost one
equilibrium point satisfying 0 < M2 < c1(i.e single
interior point).
Otherwise when there is no interior equilibrium point,
there may exist equilibrium at fl11 = 0 or fl11 = r1,
i.e., at point (0, 0) or at point (r1, 0). The point (0, 0)
can be an equilibrium point only when J ′1(0, 0) > 0,
i.e., h(0) > 0. Similarly point (c1, 0) can be equilibrium
point only when J ′1(0, 0) < 0, i.e., h(0) < 0.
3) When only one link (2) is used by Wardrop user:
In this case Wardrop users utilize only link 2, i.e., f2l2 =
r2. Following the similar steps as before, we obtain d1 ≤
f1
∗
l1
≤ r1, where d1 = max {dd, 0}. Since d1 must be
less than r1, the necessary condition for equilibrium to
exist reduces to r1 − r2 ≤ C2 − C1.
Further the equilibrium strategy (f1∗l1 , f
2∗
l2
) is given by

(M3, r2) if d1 < M3 < r1;
otherwise
(0, r2) if h(r2) > 0,
(d1, r2) if h(r2) < 0,
where M3 is the unique root(if there exist) of the
quadratic equation g(x) = ax2 + bx + c in d1 <
f1l1 < r1. Let x1 =
−b+√D
2a , x2 =
−b−√D
2a are the
roots of the Quadratic equation g(x) = 0, where a =
((C1−C2 + r2)(1−α)−αr2); b = (1−α)[4C1(C2−
r1−r2)+2r1C1]−2αr2C1); c = (1−α)[(C2−r1−r2+
C1)C1(C2− r2− r1)− r1C21 ] +αr2C
2
1 ; D = b
2− 4ac.
The quadratic equation g(x) = 0 will have unique
solution in the range 0 < f1l1 < r1 because J
′1(f11 , r2)
is strict convex in the range 0 < f1l1 < r1 ( by definition
of M/M/1 cost function). Hence there can be atmost one
equilibrium point satisfying d1 < M3 < r1(i.e single
interior point).
Otherwise when there is no interior equilibrium point,
there may exist equilibrium at fl11 = 0 or fl11 = r1, i.e.,
at point (0, r2) or at point (r1, r2). The point (0, r2) can
be an equilibrium point only when J ′1(0, r2) > 0, i.e.,
g(r2) > 0. Similarly point (r1, r2) can be equilibrium
point only when J ′1(0, r2) < 0, i.e., g(r2) < 0.
Corollary 1 Consider the symmetric parallel links, i.e.,
(C1 = C2 = C, r1 = r2 = r) network with M/M/1
delay link cost function. In a mixed user setting the
mixed equilibrium strategy ((f1∗l1 , f2
∗
l2
)) can be given by

( r2 ,
r
2 ) when r1 > f
1
l1
> 0, r2 > f
2
l2
> 0
(0, 0) when 0 ≤ f1l1 ≤ r1, f
2
l2
= 0, if α ≥ 0.5
(r, r) when 0 ≤ f1l1 ≤ r1, f
2
l1
= 0, if α ≥ 0.5
Proof:
Consider the symmetric case when C1 = C2 = C, r1 =
r2 = r. The general condition thus reduces to r < C from
prop. 1. Equilibrium can be attained under the following
scenario based on link uses.
1) When both link is used by Wardrop users:
Wardrop users utilizes both the links, i.e.,
f2l1 > 0, f
2
l2
> 0, implies cost function of both
the links are same, i.e., Tl1(fl1) = Tl2(fl2). From
Tl1(fl1) = Tl2(fl2) ⇒ f
2
l2
= f1l1 , 0 < f
1
l1
< r, and
0 < f2l2 < r, implies that necessary condition for
equilibrium to exist are always satisfied. Further the
equilibrium strategy (f1∗l1 , f
2∗
l2
) is given by ( r2 ,
r
2 ) which
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can be directly obtained from prop. (1.1).
2) When only one link (link 1) is used by Wardrop user: In
this case, Wardrop users utilize only link 1, i.e., f2l2 = 0.
This directly implies Tl1(fl1) ≤ Tl2(fl2) ⇒ f1l1 ≤ 0(from wardrop condition). Combining the above with
positive flow condition 0 ≤ f1∗l1 ≤ r1, we obtain f
1∗
l1
=
0. This suggests that equilibrium point can be given by
(f1
∗
l1
, f2
∗
l2
) = (0, 0) if there exist.
Note that (0, 0) is the boundary point solution. If
J ′1(0, 0) ≥ 0 (Nash solution of user 1) then the
equilibrium point is given by (0, 0). J1′(f1l1 , 0) can be
expressed as P (x)
Q(x) , where
P (x) = ax2 + bx+ c
a = r(2α−1); b = 2(C−r)(2(C−r)(1−α)+r); c =
(2α−1)r(C−r)2; D = 16(C−r)2(1−α)C[(C−r)(1−
α) + αr] and Q(x) > 0 for all x, thence J ′1(0, 0) ≥
0⇒ c ≥ 0⇔ α ≥ 0.5.
3) When only one link (2) is used by Wardrop user: In this
case, Wardrop users utilize only link 2, i.e., f2l2 = r.
This directly implies Tl1(fl1) ≥ Tl2(fl2) ⇒ f1l1 ≥ r(from Wardrop condition). Combining the above with
positive flow condition 0 ≤ f1∗l1 ≤ r1, we obtain f
1∗
l1
=
r. This suggests that equilibrium point can be given by
(f1
∗
l1
, f2
∗
l2
) = (r, r) if there exist.
Remark that this case is symmetrical to case when only
link 1 is used. Hence we can directly infer the condition
for equilibrium point to exist. The equilibrium point
point (r, r) exist, when α ≥ 0.5.
In Fig. (7), we depict the mixed equilibrium strategy(flow)
for the varying degree of cooperation(α). Observe the loss
of uniqueness of mixed equilibrium in presence of partial
cooperation. It is known to have unique equilibrium in the
network setting with finitely many selfish users [15]. Remark
that we have already shown in the previous section that
there exist multiple Nash equilibria in presence of partial
cooperation. Due to space limitation we illustrate this behavior
with only parallel links topology and M/M/1 cost function.
However we identify a similar remark from other configuration
also.
V. EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM
Having noted the existence of multiple Nash equilibrium
in sec.III-A using various examples, we here establish the
conditions under which unique nash equilibrium exist. Unique-
ness of Nash equilibrium is shown in [2] in case of non-
cooperative games for parallel links topology. Under some
condition, uniqueness is shown for general topology also. In
this section we follow the similar structure to establish the
uniqueness for parallel links topology in case of our setting
of user cooperation.
We follow some assumptions on the cost function J i same
as in [2].
Assumption V.1 :
G1: J i(f) =
∑
l∈L Jˆ
i
l (fl)). Each Jˆ il satisfies:
G2: J il :[0,∞)→ (0,∞] is continuous function.
G3: J il : is convex in f
j
l for j = 1, ...|I|.
G4: Wherever finite, J il is continuously differentiable
in f il , denote Kil =
δJˆil
δfi
l
.
Note the inclusion of +∞ in the range of Jˆ il , which is useful
to incorporate implicitly and compactly and additional con-
straints such as link capacities. Also note that the assumption
G3 is stronger than in [2].
Function that comply with these general assumptions, we
call type G function. For selfish user operating on parallel
links NEP is shown to exist in [2] with the function which
comply with the type G function.
We shall mainly consider cost functions that comply with
the following assumptions:
Assumption V.2 :
B1: J i(f) =
∑
l∈L f
i
l Tl(fl))
B2: Tl : [0,∞)→ (0,∞].
B3: Tl(fl) is positive, strictly increasing and convex.
B4: Tl(fl) is continuously differentiable.
Functions that comply with these assumptions are referred
to as type-B functions.
Remark 1 In Assumption B1, Tl(fl) is the cost per unit of
flow (for example mean delay) on the link l, for the total
utilization, fl =
∑
i∈I f
i
l , of that link. Note that if Tl(fl)
is the average delay on link l, it depends only on the total
flow on that link. The average delay should be interpreted as
a general congestion cost per unit of flow, which encapsulates
the dependence of the quality of service provided by a finite
capacity resource on the total load fl offered to it.
A special kind of type-B cost function is that which corre-
sponds to an M/M/1 link model. In other words, suppose that
C1: Jˆ i(f il , fl) = f il T˙l(fl) is a type-B cost function.
C2: Tl =
{ 1
Cl−fl fl < Cl
∞ fl > Cl
.
Where Cl is the capacity of the link l.
Function that comply with these requirements are referred to
as type-C functions. Such delay functions are broadly used in
modeling the behavior of the links in computer communication
networks [11], [12].
A. Parallel links network topology
In this section we study the special case where the users
from set I shares a set of parallel communication links L =
{1, 2....L} interconnecting a common source node to a com-
mon destination node. In [2], uniqueness of Nash equilibrium
is shown for the selfish users (when user do not cooperate in
managing the communication link) in parallel links, where the
cost functions (J i(f)) of users are assumed to hold assumption
V.2. However this is not true when the users have cooperation
in degree as defined in sec.(2). We observe that assumption
V.2 is not sufficient to guarantee unique Nash equilibrium
in our setting. It is a harder problem to characterize system
behavior for general degree of cooperation. Hence we consider
a special case of cooperation where a user cooperative with
similar cooperation with all other users i.e.
Jˆ i(f) = (1 − αi)J i(f) + αi
∑
k
Jk(f)
Consider the cost function of type V.2. The cost function of
each user on link l is given by
Jˆ il (f) = ((1 − α
i)f il + α
if−il )Tl(fl)
= ((1 − αi)fl + (1− 2α
i)f−il )Tl(fl)
Existence problem in the case of Nash equilibrium for the
cost function Jˆ il (f) can be directly studied as in [2].
Note that in case of αi < 0.5 for all i ∈ I, the uniqueness
of Nash equilibrium is guaranteed from E. Orda et al. [2].
Note that when αi < 0.5, the function Kil (f
−i
l , fl) is strictly
increasing function in f−il and fl.
Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium can be also observed in
case of All-positive flow in each link. By All-positive flow we
mean that each user have strictly positive flow on each link of
the network.
The following result establishes the uniqueness of Nash
Equilibrium in case of positive flow.
Theorem V.1 Consider the cost function of type V.2. Let fˆ
and f be two Nash equilibria such that there exists a set of
links L1 such that {f il > 0 and fˆ il > 0, i ∈ I} for l ∈ L1,
and {f il = fˆ il = 0, i ∈ I} for l 6∈ L1. Then fˆ = f .
Proof: Let f ∈ F and fˆ ∈ F be two NEP’s. As observed f
and fˆ satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker condition. We rewrite the Kuhn-
Tucker condition in terms of f−il , fl as below,
Kil (f
−i
l , fl) ≥ λ
i;Kil (f
−i
l , fl) = λ
i if f il > 0 ∀i, l
Kil (fˆ
−i
l , fˆl) ≥ λ
i;Kil (fˆ
−i
l , fˆl) = λ
i if fˆ il > 0 ∀i, l
The above relation and the fact that Kil (.; .) is increasing in
both of is argument will be used below to establish that f = fˆ
i.e. f il = fˆ il for every l, i. The first step is to establish that
fl = fˆl for each link l. To this end, we prove that for each l
and i, the following relation holds:
{λˆi ≤ λi, fˆl ≥ fl} implies that fˆ−i ≤ f−i, (4)
{λˆi ≥ λi, fˆl ≤ fl} implies that fˆ−i ≥ f−i. (5)
We shall prove (4), since (5) is symmetric. Assume that
λˆi ≤ λ and fˆl ≥ fl for some l and i. For f il > 0 together
with our assumptions imply that:
Kil (fˆ
−i
l , fl) = λˆ
i ≤ λi ≤ Kil (f
−i
l , fl) ≤ K
i
l (fˆ
−i
l , fˆl), (6)
where the last inequality follows from the monotonicity of
Kil in its second argument. Now , since Kil is nondecreasing
in its first argument, this implies that f−il ≤ f il , and (4) is
established.
Let L1 = {l : fˆl > fl}. Also denote Ia = {i : λˆi > λi},
L2 = L − L1 = {l : fˆ l ≤ fl}. Assume that L1 is non empty.
Recalling that
∑
l fˆ
−i
l =
∑
l f
−i
l = r
−i
, it follows from (5)
that for every i in Ia,
X
l∈L1
fˆ
−i
= r
−i
−
X
l∈L2
fˆ
−i
≤ r
−i
−
X
l∈L2
f
−i
=
X
l∈L1
f
−i
, i ∈ Ia.
From (4), we know that , fˆ−il ≤ f−il for l ∈ L1 and i /∈ Ia,
it follows that :
∑
l∈L1
fˆl =
∑
l∈L1
∑
i∈I fˆ
−i
l
I − 1
≤
∑
l∈L1
∑
i∈I f
−i
l
I − 1
=
∑
l∈L1
fl
This inequality obviously contradicts our definition of L1.
Which implies that L1 is an empty set. By symmetry, it may
also be concluded that the set {l : fˆl < fl} is also empty.
Thus, it has been established that:
fˆl = fl for every l ∈ L. (7)
We now show that λˆi = λi for each user i. To this end, note
that (4) may be strengthen as follows:
{λˆi < λi, λfl = fl} implies that either
fˆ−il < f
−i
l or fˆ
−i
l = f
−i
l = 0. (8)
Indeed if f−il = 0, then the implication is trivial. Otherwise,
if f−il > 0, it follows similar to (6) that Kil (fˆ−il , fˆl) that
fˆ−il < f
−i
l as required. Assume now that λˆi < λi for some
i ∈ I. Since
∑
l∈L fˆ
−i
l = r
−i > 0, then f−il > 0 for at least
one link l and from (8) implies that, ∑l∈L f il > ∑l∈L fˆ il =
ri, which contradicts the demand constraint for user i. We,
therefore, conclude that λˆi < λi does not hold for any user i.
A symmetric argument may be used to show that λˆi = λi for
every user i ∈ I. Combined with (7), this implies by (4) and
(5) that fˆ−il = f−il for every l, i. Again since f il = fl − f−il ,
uniqueness of f il is proved.
B. Uniqueness of NEP in general topology
It is a hard to characterize system behavior for general
network with user’s partial cooperation. For selfish users, it
is shown that there exist uniqueness for Nash equilibrium
point(NEP) under Diagonal Strict Convexity in [2].
We consider a special case of cooperation where a user
cooperates equally with all other users i.e.
Jˆ i(f) = (1 − αi)J i(f) + αi
∑
k
Jk(f)
Consider the cost function of type V.2. The cost function of
each user on link l can be thus given by
Jˆ il (f) = ((1 − α
i)fl + (1− 2α
i)f−il )Tl(fl) (9)
Theorem V.2 Consider the cost function of type V.2. Let fˆ
and f be two Nash equilibria such that there exists a set of
links L1 such that {f il > 0 and fˆ il , i ∈ I} for l ∈ L1, and
{f il = fˆ
i
l = 0, i ∈ I} for l 6∈ L1. Then fˆ = f .
Under all positive flows assumption, the Kuhn-Tuker condi-
tions for all l = (u, v) ∈ L∞ becomes
((1−αi)fil+αif−il )T ′l (fl)+(1−αi)Tl(fl)=λiu−λiv
((1−αi)fˆil+αi fˆ−il )T ′l (fˆl)+(1−αi)Tl(fˆl)=λˆiu−λiv
Summing each of these equations over i, we obtain
Huv(fl):=(αI+1−2α)T ′l (fl)+I(1−α)Tl(fl)=λu−λv
Huv(fˆl):=(αI+1−2α)fˆlT ′l (fˆl)+(1−α)ITl(fˆl)=λˆu−λv
Since the function H is strictly increasing, we follow the same
proof of Theorem 3.3 in [2] to conclude that fˆ = f .
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper is aimed at exploring user performance in routing
games where a finite number of users take into account not
only their performance but also other’s user’s performance.
We have parameterized the degree of Cooperation to capture
the user behavior from altruistic to ego-centric regime. We
notice some strange behaviors. Firstly we show the existence
of multiple Nash equilibria by a simple example of parallel
links and load balancing networks in contrast to the unique
Nash equilibrium in case of selfish users. Moreover, we then
explored the mixed user scenario, which is composed of a
finite number of Group type user seeking Nash equilibrium
and infinitely many Individual type users satisfying Wardrop
condition. We illustrate loss of uniqueness of equilibrium even
in mixed users scenario in presence of partial cooperation by
an example for parallel links network. However it is known
to have unique equilibrium in presence of only finitely many
selfish users in similar settings.
Secondly we identify two kinds of paradoxical behavior. We
identify situation where well known Braess paradox occurs
in our setting of cooperation. We show using an example of
parallel links network with M/M/1 link cost that addition of
system resources indeed degrades the performance of all users
in presence of some cooperation, while it is well known that
this is not true for this setting with only selfish users.
We also identify another type of paradox, paradox in cooper-
ation: i.e. when a given user increases its degree of cooperation
while other users keep unchanged their degree of cooperation,
this may lead to an improvement in performance of that given
user. In extreme sense a user can benefit itself by adopting
altruistic nature instead of selfishness.
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